COUNTER UAS (CUAS)

COUNTER UAS DEFENSE SYSTEM

• TRL-9 Rated
• Deployed with US Forces

 

 

A400 SERIES AIR SECURITY RADAR

• Detect Small UAS & Track
• High-Sensitivity Thermal Imager & State-of-the-Art Video Tracking
• Smart RF Inhibitor Uses Directional Antennas for Maximum Range with Minimum Collateral impact

ADIS (COUNTER-UAS DETECTION & IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM)

• Exclusively Built for Industrial & Commercial Applications
• Full Disruption Capabilities may be added in the future if approved

HIGH-RELIABILITY ELECTRONIC BEAM SCANNING (E-SCAN) TECHNOLOGY

• Exceptional Slow Movement Detection with Fast Scan Rates
• Doppler Signal Processing Technology
• Three Degrees of Target Discrimination
• Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) Technology

Liteye's Counter-UAS Defense System (CUAS) combines electronic-scanning radar target detection, electro-optical (EO) tracking/classification and directional RF inhibition capability.

CUAS is a smart-sensor and effector package capable of remotely detecting small UAS and then tracking and classifying them before providing the option to disrupt their activity. The system may be used in remote or urban areas to prevent UASs being used for terrorist attacks, espionage or other malicious activities against sites with critical infrastructure. CUAS not only works to cover your airspace, but also as a ground surveillance system as well.

All brought together in USA by Liteye Systems, who integrates, installs, and trains operators out of their Colorado facility.

M-AUDS VEHICLE PROGRAM

Vehicle Mounted Counter UAV System

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AUDS - ANTI-UAV DEFENSE SYSTEM

Detect, Track and Defeat Counter UAV System

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ADIS - COUNTER UAS SYSTEM

Counter-uas detection & identification system

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SKYWALL - ANTI DRONE DEVICE

Drone Defense Capture System

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Counter UAS rental and leasing programs are now available.

 

ON DRONES AND TACTICS: HOW UNMANNED PLATFORMS WILL CHANGE THE WAY THE INFANTRY FIGHTS

 | November 6, 2018

Suppression.

Any infantryman will be familiar with this term. And for good reason. It’s a tried-and-tested feature of successful battlefield tactics. But what does it actually mean? The answer isn’t as clear as one might hope for a doctrinal term. And it invites a follow-on question that is deeply important on the battlefield of tomorrow: What are the most effective methods of suppression?

As an operational term, US doctrine is clear. “Suppression” is listed in DoD’s official dictionary, defined as “temporary or transient degradation by an opposing force of the performance of a weapons system below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives.” It is commonly understood to be the result of either direct or indirect fire on the enemy—this is reinforced in MCRP 3-10A.4, Marine Rifle Squad. However the Army’s analogous manual, ATP 3-21.8, Infantry Platoon and Squad does not specify a method, implying that there can be other means of suppression. “A platoon or squad has suppressed an enemy when the enemy cannot prevent our forces from accomplishing their mission,” it says. “It is a temporary measure.” MCTP 3-01A, Scouting and Patrolling actually does offers an alternative method, suggesting that riot control agents can be used to suppress: “Fire support agencies can be utilized to suppress targets; riot control agents, can be employed to disrupt enemy movement.”

Recent non–live fire, force-on-force exercises in Camp Pendleton, California showed that a new tool might be uniquely suited to suppressing enemy targets: small unmanned aerial systems (SUAS). Under specific conditions, SUAS are capable of effective suppression without the need to employ any other weapons systems. Given that suppression is a critical task infantry units must be capable of conducting, we have a professional obligation to explore the possibility of suppression by alternate means.

Consider the scenario encountered in the field exercise at Camp Pendleton:

You are on patrol with a squad-sized element. You hear the buzz of SUAS overhead. Your immediate action drill is to seek the nearest cover and hold still while you radio higher to confirm whether the SUAS is friendly or hostile. While waiting for a response you stay as still as possible to avoid being noticed by the SUAS. Higher confirms that the SUAS is hostile and you know from the operations order that the enemy has the capability to call for fire based on real-time SUAS feed. Without confirmation that you have been spotted your best option is to hold firm, and hope the SUAS moves elsewhere. If you unmask your squad you will increase the likelihood you are spotted and you cannot outrun the SUAS.

This squad is unable to continue its patrol, change formations, or even organize an effective defense because any potential unmasking of the squad’s Marines might expose them to detection by the SUAS and indirect fire. The squad is unable to employ its weapons systems without uncovering itself, so has no way of neutralizing or destroying the SUAS. The Marines can only wait until it leaves the area. The squad suppressed.

To be sure, SUAS suppression is only possible under specific conditions. What are they?

  1. Units react to SUAS observation by immediately concealing themselves and halting all movement.
  2. Units are aware that they are potentially under audible or visual observation by the SUAS.
  3. The SUAS is linked with a credible threat of kinetic action, either targeting for indirect fire or with its own organic capabilities.
  4. Units do not have organic counter-UAS capabilities.
  5. The threat of SUAS targeting is greater than ground-based action.

These five conditions are specific, but certainly not so specific as to make SUAS suppression a niche capability. It is also clear, from the last condition, that SUAS suppression would be insufficient to support an assault alone. We know that drone-based targeting and drone-launched munitions are already established capabilities and have been repeatedly employed in Ukraine and the Middle East. The Marine Corps has already taken steps to acquire the new Switchblade loitering munition produced by AreoViroment. To date, the United States has employed drone-launched munitions in roles where the targets were almost certainly unaware that they were being targeted. The intent was lethal and precise strikes on unwitting targets. But what would the potential be for lethal drones that loitered over the target for as long as possible? Consider the same scenario again but with SUAS capable of dropping 40-millimeter grenades.

You are on patrol with a squad-sized element. You hear the buzz of SUAS overhead. Your immediate action drill is to seek the nearest cover and hold still while you radio higher to confirm whether the SUAS is friendly or hostile. While waiting for a response you stay as still as possible to avoid being noticed by the SUAS. Higher confirms that the SUAS is hostile and you know from the operations order that the enemy has the capability drop 40-millimeter grenades from SUAS with one-meter precision. The SUAS circles your position, and you believe it has spotted your patrol but you do not think it has spotted each individual. You cannot move because you might further expose yourself. You have to wait for the SUAS to choose a target and expend his munition or leave the area.

Again, the squad is suppressed. Imagine the psychological impact of a unit that knows with reasonable certainty it has been spotted, but individuals may remain masked. Everyone is hoping not to be the unlucky one when the batteries of the SUAS run down and the operator chooses a target. The effect is not unlike that of an unidentified sniper pinning down a patrol. The patrol does not have a way to strike back, and the individual Marines cannot know what the sniper can see. They have to wait, without any certainty that they are covered or concealed.

There is also a strong historical and tactical precedent for suppression from the air. Flybys of close air support aircraft have been used to suppress—as well as for similar tactical tasks like fix and disrupt—since the development of close air support doctrine. Notably, during the Korean War, Marine aviation frequently used daytime flyovers in addition to or in conjunction with kinetic actions to suppress Chinese and Korean forces. Significantly, the threat of close air support was enough to force many enemy formations to restrict all operations to hours of darkness. Much more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, both jet and helicopter pilots have used flyovers as a technique to disrupt insurgent attacks and ambushes without using bombs, rockets, or guns. Unarmed C-130 aircraft have been flown in patterns that mimic AC-130 gunships in overwatch, which are indistinguishable at 10,000 feet. Often the presence of aircraft on the battlefield alone was enough to disrupt and deter attacks even before any ordnance was delivered.

Knowing that SUAS will provoke a specific reaction in an enemy force means SUAS can be used deliberately to trigger that reaction. At this time it appears that the most reasonable reaction to SUAS overhead is to go to ground, which prevents a unit from employing its weapon systems or fulfilling its assigned mission. It follows that SUAS, under the right condition set, can be employed to suppress, disrupt, and fix small enemy units. It is also important to note that SUAS suppression would be most effective when employed in addition to direct or indirect fire suppression. Employment in this manner gives a small unit leader a valuable non-kinetic option for fixing, disrupting, or suppressing an enemy unit.

We can be virtually certain, by this point, that UAS and SUAS will pervade the future battlefield. Non-kinetic suppression by aircraft is not a novel tactic, but the task can be done with unmanned aerial systems as well as manned aircraft. And the proliferation of these systems, particularly unarmed variants that are cheap and commercially available, makes them ideal for employment in this way. We can also see the value of using a mix of SUAS systems that have lethal and non-lethal capabilities to complement each other. We need to make sure that we can pair emerging technologies like these with effective and lethal employment. Only then can we create decisive capability on the battlefield.

 

1st Lt. Walker Mills is an Infantry Officer in the United States Marine Corps. He is currently a student at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California.

 

Image credit: Cpl. Miguel A. Rosales, US Marine Corps

Article Courtesy of Modern War Institute

Delta flight encounters ‘unmanned aircraft’ near Boston airport

An Endeavor Air flight – a subsidiary of Delta – has reportedly encountered an “unmanned aircraft” near Boston Logan International Airport Wednesday morning, according to the Federal Aviation Administration.

The FAA confirmed that the crew of the flight reported seeing the drone around 11:15 a.m., about 15 miles northwest of the airport.

The flight had taken off from Philadelphia International Airport and was landing in Boston when the incident occurred.

The flight landed safely and did not have to make any evasive actions to avoid the drone, the FAA said to Fox News. No injuries have been reported.

The FAA and Massachusetts State Police are investigating the incident further. Delta Air Lines did not have an immediate comment.

Read Original Article: Fox News Network

Drones Pose Increasing Risks to Aircraft, Embry-Riddle Study Confirms

In a newly published study, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University researchers revealed results from a UAS detection study performed near Daytona Beach International Airport. To gather their data, the research team secured a DJI AeroScope – a passive radio-frequency sensor designed to detect, track, and record UAS activity. 

During the 13-day sampling period, researchers detected 73 different DJI-manufactured drones that made 192 separate flights.

Researchers also collected valuable operator behavior data, including common UAS flight locations, times, and altitudes.

Surprisingly, only 12 percent of all detected drones were flying near unimproved land and parks. More than three-fourths were flying in residential neighborhoods or near single-family homes. Another 21.5 percent hovered above commercial, industrial or public properties, the researchers reported.

“This was an unexpected finding,” said Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Science Dr. Ryan Wallace, lead author of the study. “We thought most drone operators would choose relatively open areas offering a safety buffer from hazards, but that wasn’t the case.”

The researchers compared detected sUAS activity with locations and altitudes prescribed by the FAA’s UAS Facility Maps.  According to the FAA, “UAS Facility Maps shows the maximum altitudes around airports where the FAA may authorize Part 107 operations without additional safety analysis.” More than one-fifth of the 177 flights were flying higher than the safe altitude prescribed for their operating area.  Moreover, researchers compared detected UAS operations to historical manned aircraft flight data, revealing several near encounters.

“These data suggest that more than one in five sUAS flights presented an unmitigated risk to nearby manned aviation operations,” the authors concluded.

They suggested that drone manufacturers should more frequently incorporate a technology called “geofencing,” which would prevent sUAS from accidentally entering restricted areas. The authors also proposed that the FAA could consider making more information on sUAS activity available to aircraft pilots.

The study, “Evaluating Small UAS Near Midair Collision Risk Using AeroScope and ADS-B,” published by the International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics and Aerospace (Vol. 5, Issue 4). Co-authors were faculty members Kristy W. Kiernan, Tom Haritos, John Robbins and Godfrey V. D’souza.

Source: UAS VISION

HK$1 million in damage caused by GPS jamming that caused 46 drones to plummet during Hong Kong show

  • Expert says powerful device must have been used given how far machines were from land

  • Online search shows large range of drone jamming and hacking electronics available for sale

The GPS jamming that caused 46 drones to plummet during a display over Victoria Harbour during the weekend caused at least HK$1 million (US$127,500) in damage, according to a senior official from the Hong Kong Tourism Board.

The incident occurred on Saturday evening at the annual Hong Kong Wine and Dine Festival, where 100 drones performed a choreographed light show commemorating the event’s 10th year.

The board’s executive director, Anthony Lau Chun-hon, said on Monday it was “unfortunate” that the event had been disrupted so badly.

“These are professional drones, which are already built with technologies that would direct them back to the take-off origin,” he said. “But the signals were so strong that many of them just dropped from the air.”

Tourism board chairman Peter Lam Kin-ngok said the culprit not only upset hundreds of thousands of visitors at the wine and dine event but also damaged Hong Kong’s reputation.

“I don’t understand why the person did that to the show, which did no good to any parties,” Lam said.

Meanwhile, the Office of the Communications Authority on Monday raided two radio dealers in Sham Shui Po for suspected illegal sale of radio jammers. The ­enforcement operation followed regular market ­surveillance, the office said.

Experts questioned the security mechanisms surrounding the display, which was produced by international drone performance company SkyMagic. The Post understands that the Singapore firm has performed in more than 10 countries in Asia, the Middle East and Europe, and had never encountered any incident on this scale.

Meanwhile, the Office of the Communications Authority on Monday raided two radio dealers in Sham Shui Po for suspected illegal sale of radio jammers. The ­enforcement operation followed regular market ­surveillance, the office said.

Experts questioned the security mechanisms surrounding the display, which was produced by international drone performance company SkyMagic. The Post understands that the Singapore firm has performed in more than 10 countries in Asia, the Middle East and Europe, and had never encountered any incident on this scale.

Read the full article in the South China Morning Post: HK$1m loss after jamming attack on drone show

 

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